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Academic Freedom: Illusions,
Allusions, and Conclusions
Kathy Menzie
Academic freedom - fine sounding words that call to
one's mind the freedoms Americans enjoy - freedom of
speech, freedom of the press, freedom to practice religion,
and freedom to gather with others. But what is academic
freedom? Is it the freedom to say what one wants in the
classroom? Is it the freedom to refuse to sign a loyalty
oath? Is it the freedom to assign grades to students? Is it the
freedom to choose the play or the books students will read
in one's class?
The definition of academic freedom is open to question,
both inside and outside the educational institution. The
American Association of University Professors defines
academic freedom for teachers in three areas: freedom in
research and publication; freedom in classroom discussion;
and the freedom to speak or write as citizens. However, not
everyone agrees with this definition. Some question who
actually has the academic freedom - an individual teacher
or an institution? The debate swirls around these questions:
is academic freedom automatically granted to all professors
as a First Amendment right? Or is it a right granted not to
individuals, but to a university?

History of Academic Freedom
Academic freedom was not a concept of the first American
colleges. The goals were to teach discipline, tradition, and
authority! to prepare students for careers in the church, law,
or medicine.' Students wanting advanced degrees had to
attend school in European countries. The students who were
educated in Germany were particularly impressed with the
ideas of the German university and they are credited with
bringing back to the United States some of the German
ideas, specifically academic freedom and the organizational
structure of the German universities.' The German model
became uniquely American when it was expanded, adapted,
and modified by the culture of free speech. The ability of
professors to express their views on any subject became part
of the American model of higher education;'
In spite ofthis enlightened concept, professors in America
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2021
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continued to be dependent on the wills of the university
presidents and boards. Salaries were low; opportunities for
study and research were few. Professors began calling for
academic freedom to provide for themselves higher salaries,
more secure positions, and the ability to search for truth
through research and scholarly reporting.' These professors
were fortunate in their timing, as the late 1800s and early
1900s were the Progressive age - reform was the movement
of the day. Activists were challenging the government to
clean up the cities and to clean up politics, from the school
boards to Congress." The conflict between the desires of the
professors and dictates oftheir employers led to the formation
of the American Association of University Professors. This
body, in turn, produced the 1915 General Declaration of
Principles. This declaration gave general statements on the
foundations of academic freedom and practical ways in
which these principles could be implemented.' Revised in
1940 and 1970, the statement has been endorsed by nearly
every American higher educational institution' and by
more than 140 professional organizations.' Three areas of
academic freedom were established in the statement:
1. Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research
and in the publication of the results subject
to the adequate performance of their other
academic duties.
2. Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom
in discussing their subject, but they should
be careful not to introduce into their teaching
controversial matter which has no relation to
their subject.
3. College and university teachers are citizens, and
should be accorded the freedom of citizens."
World War I brought major challenges to the concept of
academic freedom. There was a new aversion to change and
reform. Those who had less passion for America's entrance
into the war or those who promoted pacifist causes were
looked upon with suspicion and derision. II
In 1917,Columbia Universitybegan investigating faculty to
see if anyone was guilty of teaching and spreading subversive
ideologies. The president of Columbia said that in the past the
university had tolerated "folly" and "wrongheadedness" but
now, "What had been wrongheadedness was now sedition.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol20/iss1/3
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What had been folly was now treason.':" All over the country,
professors were being forced to defend what they said and
with whom they associated.
The search for disloyalty and radicalism continued for
many years and focused on eliminating the influence of those
who believed in or spread radical ideas, especially the ideas
of communism. Professors were forced to balance their beliefs
in academic freedom with their employers' desires for loyalty
oaths and information on possible subversive activities. The
rise of Congressional hearings and Senator Joseph McCarthy's
campaign against communists in the 1950s brought additional
threats to academic freedom. Some universities caved in to
the pressure to reject or remove any people who might not be
loyal to the American government. The concept of "innocent
until proven guilty" was absent, as people assumed any
accused professors were guilty. If a faculty member was
called before an investigation committee, the university also
began investigating the professor. During this time, nearly 100
professors lost their jobs and several hundred more "eased
out.'?' State legislatures and school administrators added
loyalty oaths and laws and rules that restricted who could
work in their schools. The AAUP, which would normally have
led the fight against McCarthyism, had an executive director
that was in ill health and the organization did nothing to
protest the assault on academic freedom."
After McCarthy was discredited and America entered
the 1960s, threats to academic freedom did not stop. A
Stanford University professor's tenure was revoked because
he opposed Stanford's involvement with activities that
supported the Vietnam war." When legislator Julian Bond
criticized the Vietnam War, the Georgia legislature refused
to seat him."

Current examples
The American climate of post-September 11, 2001
trauma and the war on terrorism contain many examples
of this predilection to prevent uncomfortable speech. Sami
Al-Arian, a University of South Florida professor, appeared
on the television show "The O'Reilly Factor" in which
he was questioned about his outspoken pro-Palestinian
views." Immediately after the show, the university received
complaints and death-threats against Al-Arian. The president
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of the university considered termination from the beginning,
not because of his words, but because of the disruption he
had caused on the campus. The university had to deal with
hundreds of calls and questions, and donor misgivings. AIArian was eventually arrested and indicted on charges of
raising money for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and officially
fired in 2003.'"
lonnie Hargis, a librarian from the University of California
at Los Angeles, criticized the United States' support for Israel
in an email response to a patriotic email. He was suspended
for five days without pay." Ken Hearlson, a professor from
Orange Coast College in Costa Mesa, California, was put
on paid leave after he was accused of verbally attacking
four Muslim students in his classroom by calling them
terrorists, murderers, and Nazis. Even though an audiotape
of his class showed he did not accuse any student of being a
terrorist, the university sent him a letter of reprimand." He
won reinstatement, but the university placed the reprimand
in his file."
Richard Berthold, a University of New Mexico professor
said to a class on Sept. 11, "Anyone who can blow up the
Pentagon has my vote." He received death threats and was
forced to leave campus for a week. He apologized, but the
university conducted an investigation." He received a
reprimand, removal from teaching freshman classes, and a
post-tenure review. He chose to retire early in 2002.2\
Mary A. Burgan, the general secretary of the AAUP,
placed a statement on the AAUP website, following the
Sept. 11 attacks which "called for a renewal of our trust in
reason in the presence of irrational acts.'?' Many responses
she received accused her of being disloyal and/or radical.
Burgan goes on to say "I have learned that academic freedom
requires practice, and even so, neither speech nor silence
will ever feel very good in opposition.'>
While other studies have sought to define what academic
freedom should be, the purpose of this study is to look at
what academic freedom is, by examining how the courts have
treated persons claiming an academic freedom infringement
and by what the courts have stated about academic freedom
in their decisions. State, district, appellate, and the United
States Supreme Court decisions will be examined. Because
it is extremely difficult to discuss the issues in the cases
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol20/iss1/3
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without having discussed the cases, this study will first
examine the cases, then examine what professors, lawyers,
and scholars say about academic freedom. This study
will then answer the question of whether or not academic
freedom is a constitutional right; and whether academic
freedom adheres to the individual or to the institution.
By constitutional, the courts question whether public
universities must give professors a constitutional right of
academic freedom. By "institutional," the courts generally
mean that academic freedom is not an individual right, but
is granted to an academic institution.

Methodology
On the Lexis-Nexis Legal Research database from 19932001, there are 207 cases containing the words "academic
freedom." The years 1993-2001 were chosen to reflect recent
court decisions. These 207 cases were examined and 11
cases were chosen, based on a court decision that included
an issue of academic freedom. Cases were eliminated if they
dealt with issues other than academic freedom. Because
case law is based on precedents set from earlier cases, nine
cases from dates earlier than 1993 were included, in order to
explain the academic freedom precedents. The courts have
not made a marked distinction between university professors
and high school teachers in the issues of academic freedom,
so this study includes cases involving both. Indeed, the
courts have often not even made a distinction between
university professors and nurses, as will be seen in the cases
presented. This study includes only public institutions.
Private institutions do not have the same academic freedom
rights. This is pointed out by Byrne in his study of academic
freedom: "Faculty and students at state universities enjoy
extensive substantive and procedural constitutional rights
against their institutions, while faculty and students at
private institutions enjoy none.'>
In a study of campus speech codes, Sunstein said,
To the extent we are dealing with private
universities, the Constitution is not implicated
at all, and hence all such restrictions are
permissible ... Private universities can do whatever
they like. They can ban all speech by Republicans,
by Democrats, or anyone they want to silence."
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An additional study may want to look at the institutional
policies and practices of private universities. Many
universities may include the AAUP academic freedom
rights in faculty handbooks and this may affect how the
courts view this issue. This is, however, beyond the scope of
this particular study, which is limited to decisions affecting
public universities.

Cases involving loyalty oaths, subversive associations
or subversive activities
The earliest cases, those that established a constitutional
basis for academic freedom, were decided from 1952-1967,
during the McCarthy era and stretching into the Cold War
era. They involved loyalty oaths and refusals to answer
questions about "subversive" activities or associations.
Adler v. Board of Education was decided in March 1952,
and involved the public schools in New York City. A civil
service law inNew York declared that the public schools could
not employ anyone who was a member of an organization
advocating overthrowing the government by force, violence,
or any unlawful means. The Supreme Court of New York
declared the law unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals
reversed and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed. The Supreme
Court said members of subversive organizations could keep
their ability to speak freely and associate freely, but they just
could not work in the New York public schools.
Justice Black dissented from this opinion and said, "The
Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and expression
to everyone in our society. All are entitled to it; and none
needs it more than the teacher."> He said the threat of the
law would play havoc with academic freedom. "A pall is
cast over the classrooms and there can be no real academic
freedom in that environment."> While this was not really
a victory for academic freedom, the dissenting words that
defended teachers and academic freedom are often quoted
in subsequent cases.
Later the same year in another case, Supreme Court
Justice Black expressed his thoughts on teachers, and this
time, this view was in the majority. This case, Wieman v.
Updegraff." was decided in December 1952. Oklahoma's
Act 205 required that every employee take a loyalty oath.
The Act made no provision for a person who may have been
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a member of an organization, but who did not know the
activities and purposes of that organization. The Supreme
Court in Oklahoma sustained the constitutionality of the
Act. The United States Supreme Court reversed and said the
Act inhibited individual freedom of movement and stifled
the flow of democratic expression and therefore violated the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice
Frankfurter said:
To regard teachers - in our entire educational
system, from the primary grades to the university
- as the priests of our democracy is therefore
not to indulge in hyperbole.... A university, then,
is a kind of continuing Socratic conversation on
the highest level for the very best people you
can think of, you can bring together, about the
most important questions, and the thing that
you must do to the uttermost possible limits is
to guarantee those men the freedom to think and
express themselves."
Five years later, in 1957, the courts were still dealing
with loyalty and governmental desires to prevent subversive
persons from teaching in schools. The case of Sweezy v. New
Hampshire is one of the most important academic freedom
cases. Nearly every article on academic freedom includes
mention of some aspect of the Sweezy decision. In this case,
Sweezy, who gave a lecture at a state university, refused
to answer questions from the New Hampshire attorney
general about the content of the lecture. The Superior Court
of Merrimack County found him in contempt of court; the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the judgment.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed saying Sweezy
was deprived of due process. The court said the "questions
asked the witness infringed upon his constitutionally
protected academic and political freedoms.'?' The court goes
on to describe academic freedom in glowing terms:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of
American universities is almost self-evident. ..
To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and universities would
imperil the future of our Nation."
Using the Universities of South Africa, Justice Frankfurter
described the academic freedom of a university. He said:
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2021
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It is the business of a university to provide

that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an
atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four
essential freedoms' of a university - to determine
for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and
who may be admitted to study."
This case added a tremendous amount to the debate on
academic freedom. The strong words are often quoted in cases
involving academic freedom. But there is a conundrum here
in Justice Frankfurter's descriptions of the four freedoms
of a university. While the first examples in this paragraph
show academic freedom is a strong personal right enjoyed
by professors, the second example, of the four freedoms of
a university, has been used to show that academic freedom
belongs to the university.
While the decision was in favor of Sweezy, it was a
short-lived victory for those wanting to avoid questions
about possible "subversive activity" as the following two
decisions were not decided in favor of the teachers who
refused to answer questions from governmental bodies.
In the first, Belian v. Board of Public Education, School
District of Philadelphia, Belian, a public school teacher,
refused to answer his superintendent's questions about his
membership in a Communist political association, and he
was fired for incompetency." The County Court of Common
Pleas reinstated him, but the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reversed the lower court and upheld the teacher's discharge.
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that Balian's due process
was not violated. This case was really decided on the basis of
due process and not academic freedom. This is a much easier
concept for the courts to address as the case can be decided
on a yes or no basis - was Belian's due process violated or
not? The courts decided it had not been and they did not deal
with the more difficult gray area of academic freedom. In the
second case, Barenblatt v. United States, 1959,'6 Barenblatt
was called as a witness before a subcommittee of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities. When he refused to
answer questions about his affiliation with the Communist
party, he was convicted of contempt of Congress. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol20/iss1/3
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conviction and the u.s. Supreme Court agreed by another 5
to 4 vote. The Court said Congress had the power to question
witnesses and could compel those witnesses to testify about
their knowledge of the Communist party. The court said the
question Barenblatt refused to answer was not protected
by the First Amendment, but it did introduce an oft-quoted
passage on academic freedom.
. . . when academic-freedom and learningfreedom are claimed, the United States Supreme
Court will always be on the alert against
intrusion by Congress into this constitutionally
protected domain .... "
This statement has formed some of the historical basis
for academic freedom as a constitutional right, though
whether this is a constitutional right for individuals or for
institutions is not addressed. However, the case was thrown
out by a 1967 case (see Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 1967).'"
Teachers had better fortune in 1960 in Shelton et al v.
Tucker et al.' Arkansas had a state law that required that
every year all teachers in state-supported schools must
disclose a list of every organization they had belonged to
or contributed money to in the last five years. The District
Court, the State Court and the Arkansas Supreme Court
agreed the law was valid, but the Supreme Court, by a vote
of 5 to 4, said the law was too unlimited and indiscriminate.
The court said, "The vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools.'>
A very important case for academic freedom was decided
in 1967. This case, Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the
University of the State of New York," is often quoted in articles
on academic freedom. In this case, New York had both state
laws and administrative regulations that prevented the state
from employing anyone who was a subversive. The District
Court said these were constitutional, but the U.S. Supreme
Court disagreed and in the process threw out any use of Adler
v. Board of Education (1952) as a precedent. The Court ruled 5
to 4 that the laws were vague because it was not clear whether
a teacher had to advocate a subversive doctrine or simply talk
about it in the abstract. The Court said:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding
academic freedom, which is of transcendent
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2021
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value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special
concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over
the classroom .... The classroom is peculiarly the
"marketplace of ideas."?
The Court heavily quoted Sweezy's" wording for
academic freedom in several parts ofits decision on this case.
The Keyishian case is often cited as the basis for academic
freedom, as the court claims that academic freedom is
a special concern of the First Amendment. However the
definition of "special concern" is not clear, which leaves the
issue open to interpretations.

Cases involving free speech
In 1968 and in 1983, the United States Supreme Court
decided two cases whose reason ing will be used in subsequent
cases. The first is Pickering v. Board ofEducation of Township
High School District 205." Pickering, a public high school
teacher, wrote a letter critical of the superintendent and
the school board to the editor of the local newspaper after
a funding proposal had been defeated by voters. The board
decided the letter was detrimental to the operation of the
schools and fired Pickering. The Circuit Court of Will County,
Illinois and the Supreme Court of Illinois agreed with the
Board of Education. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
lower court's decision, 6 to 3. The court said that without the
teacher knowingly and recklessly making false statements,
he had a First Amendment right of free speech on issues of
public importance. The court said:
Public school teachers may not constitutionally
be compelled, as a condition of retaining their
employment, to relinquish the First Amendment
rights that they would otherwise enjoy as citizens
to comment on matters of public interest in
connection with the operation of the public
schools in which they work."
This case became a very important precedent and
provided the "Pickering test," which determines whether
or not the speech in question is protected - speech on a
matter of public interest is protected. The right of comment
is assured for teachers, but this right is clearly stated as the
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same rights all citizens enjoy and is not a special right of
academic freedom.
Even thought the next case does not involve a teacher,
the above decision was cited in this case, with no distinction
made between the teacher in the Pickering case and an
attorney in the next case. In this case, Connick v. Myers,"
Sheila Myers had served as an assistant district attorney for
more than five years when she was notified she was being
transferred to another section of the criminal court. She
then put together a survey which she sent to 15 assistant
district attorneys asking for their opinions on office morale,
grievances, etc. The District Attorney fired her for refusing
the transfer and for insubordination because she distributed
the questionnaire. The District Court decided she was
wrongfully terminated because the questionnaire involved
matters of public concern. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed, but the Supreme Court reversed and upheld her
firing in a 5 to 4 vote.
The limited First Amendment interest involved
does not require that the supervisor tolerate action
that he reasonably believed would disrupt the
office, undermine his authority, and destroy the
close working relationships within the office."
Pickering was quoted as the case used to help decide the
free speech issue.
The problem is to arrive "at a balance between
the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees.':"
The Pickering test was expanded in Connick. Public
speech on a matter of public concern was protected in
Pickering, but private speech on a private matter was not
protected in Connick. In additional, the court added the
concept of disruption into the speech issue. In Connick
v. Myers (1983)," the courts allowed employers to
restrict, demote, or terminate employees who disrupted
the workplace. The court ruled against Myers and the
questionnaire she circulated, saying she could be fired
because her employer did not have to tolerate disruptive
behavior that would undermine the employer's authority.
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2021
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The court ruled that private speech on private matters could
be restricted. This case was a setback for academic freedom,
as it allowed an employer to fire or demote an employee
based on the disruption caused by the speech, not by the
speech itself. It has also become a precedent for other cases
in which the courts have made no distinction between
any government employee and professors employed by
public universities, indicating there is no special academic
freedom of speech privilege.
The case of Silva v. The University of New Hampshire
(1994) was not a Supreme Court case. It was decided at the
level of the District Court for the District of New Hampshire,
but directly involves academic freedom in a classroom. A
University of New Hampshire professor, J. Donald Silva, used
several references or metaphors in teaching his technical
writing class. In one he compared, "belly dancing to jelly
shimmying on a plate with a vibrator under it.'?" When
several women in his class complained, he was found to
have violated the university's sexual harassment policy and
was suspended without pay for a year. The District Court
found that Silva's First Amendment rights had been violated
when the university tried to apply the sexual harassment
policy to his classroom speech. Using the Connick test, the
court found that his speech in class was not on matters of
personal interest, but was related to the subject matter."
The University of New Hampshire published the AAUP
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure
in its faculty handbook. Silva contended that the university
breached this contract. The court agreed and said, "At a
minimum, this concept of academic freedom permits faculty
members freedom to choose specific pedagogic techniques
or examples to convey the lesson they are trying to impart
to their students.?? The university was ordered to reinstate
Silva and to return him to the classroom as soon as possible.
While this case is a triumph for academic freedom, it is
important to remember it was at the District Court level. Had
the case been appealed, it is not certain Silva would have
been reinstated.
Waters v. Churchill (1994) 51 also does not involve a teacher,
however, the decision in the case was used to decide the
Jeffries v.Harleston (1995) case,5'which did involve a professor,
so it is included in this collection. Cheryl Churchill, a nurse
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol20/iss1/3
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at a public hospital, was fired because she was critical of the
hospital in a private conversation. Churchill said her speech
was protected under Connick v. Myers (1983). The District
Court disagreed and said she could be fired. The Court of
Appeals reversed and said her speech was a matter of public
concern and not disruptive. The Supreme Court said that
the government could not restrict speech as a sovereign, but
could as an employer, "The government cannot restrict the
speech of the public at large just in the name of efficiency.
But where the government is employing someone for the very
purpose of effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions
may well be appropriate.t'" Seven members of the Supreme
Court voted to set the Appeals Court verdict aside and send
the case back to the lower court to reconsider.
This case further extends the tendency of the court to
see professors as no different from any other state employee,
again failing to acknowledge any special academic freedom
or any special relationship between professors and their
academic institutional employers. The Pickering/Connick
balancing test now adds the Waters case, which expanded
the definition of disruption - now the employers could
claim a possible disruption as the reason for a professor's
termination. It is not the speech itself that is the issue, but
the disruption the speech may cause.
The decision in Jeffries v. Harleston (1995)'6 was based
in part on Waters v. Churchill. Leonard Jeffries gave an offcampus speech in which he criticized and made derogatory
remarks about Jews. The Board of Trustees of the City
University of New York (CUNY) voted to remove Jeffries from
his position as chair of his department. The District Court for
the Southern District of New York found the university had
violated Jeffries' rights and had acted unconstitutionally
and ordered Jeffries reinstated in his position. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment, saying that government could not punish
a person for speaking on a public issue, without showing
the speech caused a disruption of government operations.
However, one month after the Appeals Court decision,
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Waters v.
Churchill (1994). When Jeffries v. Harleston was appealed
to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court set the Appeals
Court verdict aside and ordered the lower court to reconsider
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2021
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Jeffries v. Harleston by looking at the decision in Waters.
The Appeals Court reversed the District Court decision and
affirmed Jeffries demotion, saying that the trustees showed
they had a reasonable expectation that Jeffries' speech
would harm or disrupt CUNY operations." The Court noted
that a "friend of the court" brief suggested that Jeffries
deserved greater protection with his speech than the nurse,
but because Jeffries was not fired, only demoted, the court
said his academic freedom was not infringed. Professor
Jeffries was compared to Churchill, the nurse in a public
institution. The court ruled that an employee, in this case,
a professor, could be demoted by his employers when the
employers had a "reasonable expectation" that his speech
could cause a disruption.
In the following case, Keith Dambrot, head basketball
coach at Central Michigan University, sued the university
because his contract was not renewed (Dambrot v. Central
Michigan University, 1995)." Dambrot is white, though most
of the basketball team's members were black. Several times,
Dambrot used the word "nigger" when he was talking to his
players. He said he had heard black players use the term
and felt it was a term with positive meaning, as in a person
who is "fearless, mentally strong, and tough.'?" The District
Court decided, and the Appeals Court for the Sixth District,
affirmed that Dambrot's termination did not violate his First
Amendment rights. The Courts said Dambrot's speech was
private and not speech on matters of public concern."
While not specifically an academic freedom issue, in
Westbrook v. Teton County (1996), Dr. Pamela Westbrook
was successful in her suit against the Teton County School
District No.1, when the District Court for the District of
Wyoming, struck down the school district's "Staff Conduct"
policy that prevented criticism of other employees."
Westbrook had argued that speech in an educational setting
or that addressed academic issues should receive more
protection. She cited the 1969 Tinker v. Des Moines" that said
students "do not shed their constitutional rights of freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'>' The court
agreed with her, but said, "Although it generally is true that
teachers do not shed these rights at the schoolhouse gate,
this does not mean that by passing this gate teachers are
clothed with First Amendment rights in addition to those
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol20/iss1/3
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they enjoy purely as public citizens.'>' This case is both
good and bad for academic freedom. The court ruled that
the criticism policy prohibited too much and cited the cases
that have lauded academic freedom, but the court also said
that there is no special academic freedom for teachers - at
least no more than that enjoyed by all citizens.
Academic freedom and the right to decide curriculum
are issues in Edwards v. California University of
Pennsylvania (1998).'" Dilawar Edwards taught a class
in Educational Media that included how to use films,
photographs, etc. in classroom teaching. Edwards began
including in his syllabi additional material that covered
bias, censorship, and religion. When a student complained
that Edwards was teaching religious ideas, he was told to
stop using religious materials in class. When he failed to
show up for some classes, he was suspended with pay for
part of the school term. Edwards filed a lawsuit against the
university. The District Court and the Appeals Court for
the Third Circuit both affirmed Edwards' suspension. The
Appeals Court said:
We conclude that a public university professor
does not have a First Amendment right to decide
what will be taught in the classroom .... although
a teacher's out-of-class conduct, including her
advocacy of particular teaching methods, is
protected, her in-class conduct is not.. .. Although
the concept of academic freedom has been
recognized in our jurisprudence, the doctrine
has never conferred upon teachers the control of
public school ourricula."
Using Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957), the court noted
the four freedoms of a university: "who may teach, what may
be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted
to study." The Appeals Court concluded that Edwards did
not have a right to choose his own classroom materials in
the face of the objections by the university. This argument
shifted some of the court's sweeping defense of academic
freedom in Sweezy. This decision places academic freedom
with the university, indicating the right of academic freedom
adheres to the university and not to particular professors.
In Bonnell v. Lorenzo (2001),"" the District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, found in
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favor of Bonnell. John Bonnell had been suspended from
his teaching position at Macomb Community College for
profanity in the classroom. The District Court ordered
Bonnell reinstated and said he had a First Amendment
right to free speech in his classroom. The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed this decision. The Appeals
Court said:
This case presents us with the difficult task of
balancing the precious First Amendment rights
of a professor in the academic setting, against
the legal obligations of a college to guarantee the
rights of students to learn in an environment free
of sexual harassment and hostility. Mindful of
the significant import of the respective interests
involved, we conclude that the balance tips in
favor of the Col lege.?«
Later in their decision, the court said, "Plaintiff may
have a constitutional right to use words such as 'pussy,'
'cunt,' and 'fuck,' but he does not have a constitutional
right to use them in a classroom setting.'?' While the court
acknowledged its interest in classroom debate, it said that
vulgar or profane speech is not protected, especially when
it was not germane to the subject and in a setting, such as a
classroom, when students are a captive audience and cannot
"avert their ears." In a battle between academic freedom
and expression that may be sexually harassing, academic
freedom will probably lose. This presents a difficult issue
and may place in conflict those who favor totally free speech
and those who would protect the right of people not to hear
uncomfortable speech.

Miscellaneous cases
Grades were the focus of Parate v. Isibor (1989)71. Natthu
Parate was a professor at Tennessee State University whose
contract was not renewed. Parate had changed a grade for
Student X, but not for Student Y. Student Y took his complaint
to the Dean of the School of Engineering and Technology,
Edward Isibor. Isibor ordered Parate to change Student Y's
grade, Parate refused. The court held that:
The individual professor may not be compelled,
by university officials, to change a grade that
the professor previously assigned to her student.

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol20/iss1/3

16

Democratic
Cornmu n iquc
Vol. 20 Illusions,
Spring 2006
85
Menzie: Academic
Freedom:
Allusions, and Conclusions

Because the individual professor's assignment of
a letter grade is protected speech, the university
officials' actions to compel the professor to alter that
grade would severely burden a protected activity'?'
The court went on the find, however, that Parate "has
no constitutional interest in the grades which his students
ultimately receive."?' The court found that the university
may not order Parate to change a grade, but the university
itself may administratively change a grade.
There were a number of incidents between the two men,
including one time when Isibor visited and disrupted Parate's
classroom. Parate alleged this incident had violated his right to
academic freedom, but the court said the one incident did not
constitute casting "a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.'?'
In this case, even though the courts allowed for academic
freedom, they took a backhanded swing at it anyway. The
court said the university had violated Parate's academic
freedom when it tried to force him to change a grade, but
then said, however, that the university can change the grade.
The ultimate freedom to decide the grade a student receives
seems to rest with the university. In this case, the court also
found that the incident where the dean interrupted Parate's
classroom lecture was not enough to be seen as disruptive.
In this ruling, the court decided the authority - and the
academic freedom - resided with the university and not
with an individual professor.
In Burnham, Marchese v. Ianni (1997),75 Albert Burnham
and Ronald Marchese were professors in the history
department and Lawrence Ianni was chancellor of the
University of Minnesota. In a display case outside of the
history department were photographs of all the history
professors, dressed in costume to indicate their research
specialty. Both Burnham and Marchese were photographed
in military costume with weapons. Meantime, a newly
appointed vice-chancellor began receiving death threats.
The affirmative action officer on campus saw the history
display and objected to the weapons, in light of the threats
to the vice chancellor. Ianni sent the campus police to open
the case and remove the photographs. The two professors
brought suit against Ianni for violation of academic freedom
rights." The District Court and the Appeals Court agreed
that the rights of the professors had been violated. This
is one of the few cases where the professors actually won
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their case against the university. Though the professors said
their academic freedom was violated, the case is really more
one of free speech, the free speech in this case being the
pictures in the display case. This case, while seeming to
support academic freedom, really supports free speech/free
expression, a right guaranteed to all citizens.
In Boring v. The Buncombe County Board of Education
(1998),77 Margaret Boring was a high school drama teacher.
For a state contest, she chose a play that depicted a singleparent family that included a lesbian and a woman pregnant
with an illegitimate child. The play won several awards at
regional competition, but before the state contest, the play
was performed at the high school and a parent of one of the
students complained to the principal. The principal then
read the play and told Boring she could not perform it. After
several decisions and appeals, the case was sent back to the
Appeals Court for the Fourth Circuit who said:
The only issue in this case is whether a public high
school teacher has a First Amendment right to
participate in the makeup of the school curriculum
through the selection and production of a play. We
hold that she does not, and affirm the judgment of
the District Court dismissing the complaint."
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied
a motion to stop a play at Purdue University in the next
case, Linnemeir v. Board of Trustees of Purdue University
(2001).7" Three Indiana residents asked the court to stop
Purdue (a state university) from performing the play, Corpus
Christi. The three residents claimed performance of the
play endorsed anti-Christian beliefs, a violation of the First
Amendment. The court said, if a "violation arose each time
a student believed that a school practice either advanced or
disapproved of a religion, school curricula would be reduced
to the lowest common denominator, permitting each student
to become a 'curriculum review committee' unto hi mself.?"
The court seems to be on the side of the university when an
outside censor wants to control the university.
The last case in this section, Urofsky v. Gilmore (2000)"
involves Internet access. In this case, six Virginia professors
challenged the constitutionality of a "law restricting state
employees from accessing sexually explicit material on
computers that are owned or leased by the state.':" Professors
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol20/iss1/3
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said they would be prohibited from assigning students
online research assignments on decency. Others said they
would be prohibited from research on sexual themes in
Victorian poetry or Freud's theories or pornography and
gender roles." The District Court found in favor of Urofsky
and said the professors' First Amendment rights had been
violated. The Appeals Court for the Fourth Circuit heard
the case en bane and reversed the District Court. They cited
Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education (1998),
because the Virginia Act affected the professors as state
employees, not citizens.
The Court commented on the academic freedom issue in
this way:
Alternatively, Appellees maintain that even if the
Act is valid as to the majority of state employees, it
violates the First Amendment academic freedom
rights of professors at state colleges and universities
and thus is invalid as to them. In essence,
Appellees contend that a university professor
possesses a constitutional right to determine
for himself, without the input of the university
(and perhaps even contrary to the university's
desires), the subjects of his research, writing, and
teaching... Our review of the law, however, leads
us to conclude that to the extent the Constitution
recognizes any right to "academic freedom" above
and beyond the First Amendment rights to which
every citizen is entitled, the right adheres in the
University, not in individual professors, and is not
violated by the terms of the Act.»
After a lengthy discussion of the history of academic
freedom and court decisions, the Circuit Court said that in
spite of other Supreme Court decisions referring to academic
freedom, they felt there was no special right adhering only
to teachers."
The Court discussed Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957)
and pointed out that in spite of the nod to academic freedom,
Sweezy's conviction was not reversed based on the First
Amendment, but on due process: the Attorney General
should not have investigated Sweezy. The Court said Justice
Frankfurter's words on academic freedom were in favor of
the university, not individuals. In his discussion of the four
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freedoms of a university, there is no mention of Sweezy's
individual rights as a professor being violated. And so, based
on these words, the Fourth Circuit felt the Virginia Act did
not violate the University's academic freedom. The court
noted that in later decisions, such as Keyishian v. Board of
Regents (1967) the rights that the earlier cases may have called
academic freedom, were extended to all public employees.
The Court said academic freedom is simply an old concept
that meant professors were the "first public employees to be
afforded the now-universal protection against dismissal for
the exercise of First Amendment rights. Nothing in Supreme
Court jurisprudence suggest that the 'right' claimed by
Appellees extends any further.'> Judge Luttig said:
The court holds today, as has been uniformly
recognized by the Supreme Court through the
years, only that there is no constitutional right
of free inquiry unique to professors or to any
other public employee, that the First Amendment
protects the rights of all public employees equally...
the academic can be no less accountable to the
people than any other public servant. His speech
is subject to limitations of the First Amendment
certainly no more, but just as certainly no less,
than is the custodian's."
The Supreme Court refused to review the case. This case
is not a positive decision for academic freedom - in fact,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals heavily restricted the
definition of academic freedom. They even said the four
professors who claimed an academic freedom issue in their
desire to have unrestricted access to sexually explicit material
on the Internet showed audacity in their claim that there is
special academic freedom protection for professors." The
court said that any academic freedom rights are simply free
speech rights that any person receives as a citizen. Melvin
Urofsky, the plaintiff in this case, said the authors of this
Act did not have university professors in mind - they were
worried about people in the prison system and the highway
system and were surprised to find professors concerned about
the law. He noted that the ruling applies only to the Fourth
Circuit" and that possibly Judge Wilkinson's dissenting view
on the issue of academic freedom may become the stronger
rule." While the pronouncements in this particular case
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol20/iss1/3
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may not have much application beyond the Fourth Circuit,
they present a discouraging view of academic freedom.

Literature Review
Is academic freedom a contractual right? Does it adhere
to the university or to individual professors? A number of
studies have explored this question. Now that the court
cases have been explained, this section will discuss what
other scholars have found in their studies of these cases.
Murphy-sees constitutional protection for academic freedom
as "emerging," rather than developed. He feels that the ways
in which the Supreme Court has acknowledged academic
freedom is a promise of future protection. It is inevitable, he
claims, that the Supreme Court soon will accept and rule on
a case that involves a clear violation of academic freedom,
perhaps one that involves a wrongful termination. Connolly
also feels academic freedom is developing." He considers
academic freedom a "kind of cousin of freedom of speech.'?'
It is a special privilege - to seek truth - and as a burden
- to be worthy of the term by respecting others who also
seek truth. An additional study believes the Supreme Court
has recognized academic freedom as a constitutional right
and points out that the court said it will watch carefully
cases that claim academic freedom." The author of the
study believes the Court will continue to protect academic
freedom based on the teachers' roles in society, since the
Court has already given strong support to recognition of the
term academic freedom in cases that have come before it."
However, the problem with the idea that academic freedom
is "emerging" is that most of the cases upon which these
articles have based their conclusions are the earlier cases,
decided in the 1950s and 1960s. Later cases do not seem to
support the conclusions of Murphy and Connolly, as the
courts have not strongly protected academic freedom" and
have in fact upheld the right of the university to choose
curriculum, assign grades, demote faculty for disruptive
speech, and restrict Internet access.
Byrne" points out the confusion with the term academic
freedom. It has not been conclusively defined by the court
and while the expansive language of Sweezy and Keyishian"
would indicate the Court was ready to place academic
freedom in a special category, such has not been the case.
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Byrne suggests that the Keyishian definition does not mean
what most have assumed it does. He argues that the case
really says that academic freedom prevents a professor from
being interfered with by government officials who may have
a particular point of view they want expressed, but does
not prevent the same kind of interference from a university
administration. Standler'" also notes this and says that
academic freedom, as the courts have interpreted it, is a
professional right and not a legal concept. It does not protect
professors from being dismissed by their universities, but
does protect them from being dismissed by the mayor or
governor. In a study of numerous cases, Standlar'w says
that academic freedom, as the courts have interpreted
it, is a professional right. He sees academic freedom as a
protection from being fired by a mayor or a governor, but not
as protection from being dismissed by a university. Standler
indicates that he read 160 cases and in cases "involving
professor v. university or student v. university disputes, the
university nearly always wi ns."!"
In looking at some of the same cases, Byrne'« draws a
slightly different conclusion on how the courts see academic
freedom (again, using information from Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 1957), he notes:
The court's rhetoric praises academic freedom as
an institutional right to be free from orthodoxy
prescribed by the government at large: .... The
"orthodoxies" feared are not those of academics
themselves, but those imposed by non-academic
officials seeking to advance their views on various
policies .... The focus on the protection of the
system from government interference can easily
be missed because the term academic freedom
had always signified an individual right against
any interference by laypersons.""
Chang>' feels it is vital to American life that university
professors remain free to question, research, and teach. When
a professor is penalized for controversial speech, it calls into
question the very foundations of the university. "Therefore,
by resuscitating the vague yet emphatic principles set out in
Sweezy v New Hampshire, we help give meaning not only
to a brief moment of Supreme Court rhetoric, but also to the
very basis of academic scholarship and university life."'"
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol20/iss1/3
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While Chang is correct in her praise of Sweezy's statement on
academic freedom, Sweezy v. New Hampshire was decided a
long time ago: in 1957.
On the other side of the debate, some see academic
freedom as a contractual and institutional right. Ryan'?'
sees academic freedom as a professional privilege, not a
right a person receives as a constitutional right. "The point
of establishing that academic freedom is a professional
freedom is that it allows us to see that you can ask people
to curb their conduct in ways that you would not do in the
outside world."!"
Others agree that academic freedom is a professional
right. Academic freedom is not a human or constitutional
right, according to Sh ils.!" It is a "qualified right," one that
is realized because one is a university professor in a public
university, but is incumbent on one's following certain
standards and rules and is predicated on the primary goal
of seeking and teaching truth. The professor must conform to
accepted standards in both research and teaching (including
such things as class attendance and assigning grades). For
Shils, truth is something that can be achieved and arguments
that are true and valid should have more status than an idea
that is unproven or untrue - without this standard, one
cannot assess scholarly work. However, if all ideas have the
same weight and all ideas are valid, then academic freedom
has no meaning. So Shils would place under academic
freedom only those ideas that are true and valid, rather than
allowing a professor total academic freedom to do and say
whatever he or she so chooses.!" While this definition may
sound enlightening, the courts have not supported this idea.
Pavela'" advises caution for professors in what
they think may be protected by academic freedom.
"Constitutionally protected academic freedom is a fragile
concept. It's not clear that courts will continue to see it as
a 'special concern' of the First Amendment."!': When there
are conflicts between the university and the professor,
the court will balance the interests of the two, but he
says the concept of academic freedom cannot be based on
sweeping freedoms or rights. Pavela is correct in his idea
that academic freedom for individual professors is a fragile
concept. The words from historical cases are strong, but
the decisions in later cases have not supported the words.
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2021
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The courts have indeed not seen academic freedom as a
special concern, but have seen it as a right granted to all
by the First Amendment!" or as a right that adheres to the
university and not to individual professors.!"
Chang!" questions whether or not academic freedom
protects professors who criticize their superiors. Critical
speech may not be constitutionally protected. The way
the decision is usually applied in Connick!" encourages
professors to assume critical speech is not constitutionally
protected. Using the Connick test (also referred to as the
Pickering/Connick test or the Pickering/Connick/Waters
test "0) which measures whether or not the speech in question
is a matter of public concern, the courts are drawing
parallels to the participants in these cases and participants
in university cases. Myers was an assistant district attorney,
a public employee who worked for a public employer, just
as professors are public employees who work for a public
employer, the court says. Chang points out that university
professors are not employees in the way one might usually
think of employees, but the courts have not always recognized
this as a difference. Using the four freedoms of a university,
from Sweezy v. New Hampshire,:" Rabbari'" agrees with
Chang and also notes that the courts seem to be attributing
academic freedom to universities rather than individuals.
This is also shown in Urofsky v. Gil more.!" when the Fourth
Circuit gave academic freedom rights only to the university.
Caster'> also expresses concern that courts may apply
public employee tests to university professors. This could
have a marked chilling effect on professors and could pose
a threat to the reasons a university exists, she says. Because
a university is different from any other public institution,
academic speech should receive greater protection.
This may be the reason for the decision in Boring v.
Buncombe County Board of Education!" when the Fourth
Circuit Court said a public school teacher had no right
to choose course curricula. Going one step further in
acknowledging the employer's rights, the decision in Waters
v. Churchill (1994), a case in which a public employee could
be disciplined when her employer felt her speech may cause
a disruption, Fugate!" says the court completely reversed
its earlier direction. Formerly an employer had to prove an
actual disruption, but with the Waters decision, employers
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol20/iss1/3
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may be able to completely avoid any mention of academic
freedom and simply claim a potential disruption to dismiss
or discipline an employee. This case was indeed used in a
case of a professor and a un iversity.!" Fugate's contention is
that academic freedom is in danger because, "If the price
for voicing controversial ideas is sanction or discharge, a
university may be peaceful, but it will also be sterile."?'
There has not yet been a clear definition from the
Supreme Court on what academic freedom really means.
Justices Frankfurter and Black devoted many eloquent words
to academic freedom, but neither one of them left behind a
definition. Many of the cases of the 1950s and 1960s in which
academic freedom is mentioned were not decided on the
basis of academic freedom and while the words have been
quoted often, the court has not shown any great willingness
to define or defend these words further. The cases included
in this study from 1993-2001, would seem to indicate that
the courts are not as sympathetic to academic freedom as
they have been in the past.

Conclusion: how have the courts dealt with academic
freedom?
The answer is: not clearly. The stirring words on academic
freedom from Wieman v. Updegraff (1952), Sweezy v. New
Hampshire (1959), and Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967)
are like fog - they look substantial, but when a person tries
to grab a handful, there is nothing there. The courts have
spoken eloquently on academic freedom. Justice Douglas in
Adler v. Board of Education (1952) said, "The Constitution
guarantees freedom of thought and expression to everyone
in our society. All are entitled to it; and none needs it more
than the teacher.":" He continues by saying if this freedom
is not allowed, "A pall is cast over the classrooms and there
can be no real academic freedom in that environrnent.t''> In
Wieman v. Updegraff Justice Frankfurter said, "To regard
teachers ... as the priests of our democracy is therefore not
to indulge in hyperbole. It is the special task of teachers to
foster those habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry
which alone make for responsible citizens, who in turn, make
possible an enlightened and effective public opinion...."l2? In
Sweezy v. New Hampshire the court said, "The essentiality
of freedom in the community of American universities is
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almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital
role in a democracy that is played by those who guide
and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the
intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would
imperil the future of our Nation."!" In Barenblatt v. United
States the court said "when academic-freedom and learningfreedom are claimed, the United States Supreme Court will
always be on the alert against intrusion by Congress into
this constitutionally protected domain.'?" In Keyishian
v. Board of Regents the court said "....Our Nation is deeply
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of
the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast
a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom ...."l",
Yet, nowhere does the court explain exactly what it
means by academic freedom or exactly what expression is
protected. It is unclear whether or not a professor has the
right to criticize his or her superiors and/or the university.
Pickering, the teacher in Pickering v. Board of Education, was
permitted to criticize the Board of Education as his speech
was ruled a matter of public concern. Myers, the assistant
attorney general in Connick v. Myers, was not allowed to
circulate a questionnaire which appeared to criticize (and
disrupt) the office where she worked. The nurse, Cheryl
Churchill in Waters v. Churchill, was fired for criticizing
her boss. Though these people were not professors, the
rulings were used in the case of Jeffries v. Harleston, when
Jeffries was demoted for an off-campus speech he delivered.
The court subjects each case involving free speech to the
Pickering/Connick/Waters balancing test, to see whether or
not the speech is on a matter of public concern, making no
distinction between any state employee (such as an assistant
district attorney or nurse at a public hospital) and professors.
All cases are subjected to the balancing test, with no special
privilege for professors.
On a mixed note, the court did strike down a criticism
policy that prevented more speech than it should in
Westbrook v. Teton County School District. But the court
also said, "Although it generally is true that teachers do not
shed these rights at the schoolhouse gate, this does not mean
that by passing this gate teachers are clothed with First
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol20/iss1/3
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Amendment rights in addition to those they enjoy purely as
public citizens.':"
It is also unclear what privileges professors have within
their classrooms. The District Court for the District of New
Hampshire found that J. Donald Silva'? could use sexual
references or metaphors in teaching his technical writing
class. However, Dilawar Edwards in Edwards v. California
University of Pennsylvania, was not allowed to add material
to his class curricula that the university felt had no place. The
Third Circuit Appeals Court said "we conclude that a public
university professor does not have a First Amendment right
to decide what will be taught in the classroom.... Although
the concept of academic freedom has been recognized in
our jurisprudence, the doctrine has never conferred upon
teachers the control of public school curricula.":> Margaret
Boring discovered this in Boring v. Buncombe County Board
of Education when the Fourth Circuit Court said a public
school teacher had no right to choose course curricula.
The concept of academic freedom did not help Keith
Dambrot, head basketball coach at Central Michigan
University, who was fired when he used a term he interpreted
to have a positive meaning.': It did not help John Bonnell,
either, who in Bonnell v. Lorenzo found that his academic
freedom to speak in his classroom did not extend to vulgar
and profane speech, because students were a "captive
audience and could not avert their ears."!"
The right to free expression was upheld in Burnham v.
Ianni when the court said the university did not have the
right to remove photographs in a department display, but
the case was decided more on the basis of the right to free
speech and free expression, rather than academic freedom.
This point of view actually supports the idea that academic
freedom is not a separate right, as the right of free speech is
one enjoyed by all Americans, not just professors.
Natthu Parate found the university had the right to
change a grade he assigned and that the disruption of his
classroom by administrators did not cast "a pall of orthodoxy
over the classroom."?' The court did not define unreasonable
interference or indicate how many times or in what instances
a classroom could be interrupted in such as way to cast this
"pall of orthodoxy." This could also mean the court is seeing
the issue as Byrne does, that the pall of orthodoxy is cast by
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government interference, not university interference. '"
The record so far shows that the Supreme Court has
not spoken clearly on what it will accept as a definition of
academic freedom. Even the scholars who have studied this
issue do not agree.
The courts, however, are clearer on academic freedom
as a contractual right and if academic freedom adhere
to the individual or to the institution. Some faculty
handbooks contain academic freedom rights and these are
often considered to be a contract that can be considered
legally binding. This was certainly true for Donald Silva.
The University of New Hampshire published the AAUP
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure
in its faculty handbook. Silva contended that the university
breached this contract and the district court agreed.'>
But in many cases, the courts seem to be seeing academic
freedom as something that adheres to the institution - and
not necessarily to individuals. Many rulings return to
Justice Frankfurter's description of the academic freedom
of a university.'> The courts seem to be using these four
freedoms as an indication that academic freedom adheres to
the university, not to individual professors.
The courts also see professors as state employees who have
a contractual relationship with their university employer.
An employee can be fired or demoted for potentially causing
a disruption, even though he or she may have a free speech
right to speak on a particular subject. The right of deciding
whether or not a person's speech will cause a disruption
rests with the employer. The academic freedom to express
one's opinion can be superceded by the employer's fear of a
disruption. And any state employee is seen in the same light
as any other state employee - there is no special category
for professors.
As noted earlier, the courts do not allow professors to
decide what they will teach. A public school teacher had no
right to choose course curricula'" and a university professor
has no right to decide the final grade a student receives.!"
The school has the right to decide curricula and to decide
the final grade a student actually receives.
The Virginia court in Urofsky v. Gilmore (2000) said there
is no special grant of academic freedom. The court said,
Our review of the law, however, leads us to
conclude that to the extent the Constitution
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recognizes any right to "academic freedom" above
and beyond the First Amendment rights to which
every citizen is entitled, the right adheres in the
University, not in individual professors .... '12
The examination of the cases included in this study
indicates that the courts see academic freedom as a right that
adheres to the academic institution - it is the institution that
decides what is appropriate to discuss in a classroom and
the institution that decides what is appropriate curriculum.
What I have argued here is that if a university wishes to
terminate a professor, there are ways to do so, often without
dealing with academic freedom issues at all. For professors,
arguing academic freedom is not necessarily a benefit many cases do not prevail on these grounds. And herein
lies the difficult part - indeed academic freedom may
have been violated, but it is so much easier for the courts to
decide a contractual issue, than a constitutional issue, so if
it is possible for either side to argue a contractual case, that
side has a greater chance of prevailing. The United States
Supreme Court has not yet given a clear definition of what
it considers to be or to not be academic freedom. However
on the question of who owns the academic freedom, the
individual or the institution, the court appears to slide the
balance toward the academic institution. Cases covered in
this paper seem to point to these conclusions. However,
the issue is still open to question and debate. It remains an
ambiguous and elusive term, meaning different things to
different people and to different organizations. It is "often
defined by its absence":" as opposed to a clear discussion of
what the term covers. There seems to be no real consensus
on what academic freedom actually means, whom it covers,
and what the consequences should be for breaching it.
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